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OPINION  OF  THE  COURT 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
This is one of the rare cases in which the Speedy Trial 
Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161–3174, requires that we vacate a 
conviction and remand for dismissal of the indictment. 
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Kevin L. Reese was convicted in the District Court of 
six counts each of wire fraud and aggravated identity theft.  
His sentence was 70 months’ imprisonment, restitution, and 
three years of supervised release.  He appeals several issues 
affecting his conviction and sentencing, but we need address 
only one.  
Three weeks before the scheduled date of Reese’s trial, 
after more than 50 days had expired on Reese’s 70–day time 
limit under the Speedy Trial Act (for convenience, the “Act”), 
the District Court ordered a sua sponte continuance that 
postponed Reese’s trial by an additional 79 days, at least 71 
of which were not automatically excluded under the Act.  At 
the time the continuance was entered, the District Court 
neither cited the Act, nor stated that time would be excluded, 
nor made findings of fact that would justify an exclusion of 
time under it.  As a result, the 70–day time limit to bring 
Reese to trial expired long before his trial began.  
When Reese moved before trial to dismiss the 
indictment under the Act, the District Court should have 
granted the motion.  The statutory remedy is to vacate 
Reese’s conviction and remand for dismissal of the 
indictment.  The Court should, based on the Act, determine in 
the first instance whether the dismissal is with or without 
prejudice.  
I.  Background 
In December 2015 a federal grand jury in the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania returned an indictment charging 
defendant-appellant Kevin L. Reese with six counts of wire 
fraud and six counts of aggravated identity theft related to his 
work as an office manager at Sheehan Pipe Line and 
Construction Company in Dunmore, Pennsylvania.  The 
indictment alleged that, between November 2014 and August 
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2015, Reese devised and implemented a scheme to defraud 
Sheehan by cutting false checks on Sheehan’s behalf to other 
employees and then cashing them in their names.  
Soon after he was indicted, Reese retained defense 
attorney Joseph D’Andrea for all proceedings in the trial 
court.  After his arraignment on January 4, 2016, he entered a 
plea of not guilty as to all counts.  On January 11, 2016, the 
District Court entered an order scheduling jury selection and 
the start of trial for March 7, 2016.  
Between February 23 and September 1, 2016, the 
Court granted six motions for continuance, five filed by the 
Government with D’Andrea’s consent, and one filed by 
D’Andrea on Reese’s behalf.  For each of these orders the 
Court excluded time under the Speedy Trial Act on the 
ground that additional time would enable the Government and 
Reese to continue negotiating a potential plea deal.  As a 
result of these continuances, Reese’s trial was scheduled for 
October 24, 2016, with a pretrial conference on October 14.  
On October 12, 2016, however, the District Court sua 
sponte entered an order rescheduling Reese’s trial for 
December 5, 2016.  The order did not state a reason for the 
continuance other than to say it was “in accordance with the 
Court’s calendar.”  The order also stated that the delay in 
Reese’s trial occasioned by this order—a period of 42 days—
would be excluded under the Speedy Trial Act because “[t]his 
Court finds that the ends of justice served by this order 
outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a 
speedy trial pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and 
(h)(7)(B)(iv).”  
On November 10, 2016, the District Court held a pre-
trial conference, which Reese attended represented by 
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D’Andrea.  It opened with the following colloquy concerning 
the date of Reese’s trial:   
THE COURT:   So I’m setting the trial - - and I 
apologize for this, because I can’t 
try the case until February, 
February 22nd. 
MR. D’ANDREA: February 22nd will work for me.  
I’m just really bad in December 
and January myself.  February 
opens up. 
The District Judge and the attorneys then discussed other pre-
trial matters and the Court’s trial practices.  There was no 
further discussion of postponing Reese’s trial or the need to 
exclude time under the Speedy Trial Act.  
Following the conference, the District Court entered an 
order rescheduling Reese’s trial for February 22, 2017.  It 
stated that Reese’s trial was rescheduled “per the final pretrial 
conference held November 10, 2016,” without any further 
explanation for the basis of the rescheduling.  It did not 
mention the exclusion of time under the Speedy Trial Act or 
use any language that would suggest a finding by the Court 
that an exclusion was proper.  No pre-trial motions were 
pending or filed between November 10, 2016 and February 9, 
2017.  
On February 10, 2017, twelve days before trial, Reese 
filed pro se a motion requesting a hearing for the purpose of 
dismissing his retained counsel and obtaining the appointment 
of substitute counsel.  According to Reese, he was entitled to 
have new counsel appointed on the eve of trial because there 
was a complete breakdown in communication and an 
irreconcilable conflict with his retained attorney, D’Andrea.  
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On February 15, 2017, the Court held a hearing on Reese’s 
motion for appointment of counsel and denied the motion 
from the bench.1 
Just before trial began, Reese, through D’Andrea, filed 
a motion for dismissal of the charges based on a violation of 
the 70–day time limit under the Speedy Trial Act.  The Court 
denied the motion from the bench, stating as follows: 
I am going to deny the motion.  The 
defendant sat on his rights, he didn’t do 
anything . . . .  And he made no 
indications that he disagreed with the 
continuances.  And throughout these 
proceedings he had counsel.  We have a 
case defendant’s consent is not required 
for a continuance request by his counsel 
for the ends of justice, and that’s . . . 
[United States v. Herbst, 666 F.3d 504 
(8th Cir. 2012)].  
And that would appear under all of the 
circumstances to be applicable in this 
case even though in effect – the bottom 
line is as stated in the defendant’s 
motion, he didn’t request – his counsel 
did not object to the – and he had 
counsel throughout. . . .  
                                              
1 Because we resolve Reese’s appeal under the Speedy Trial 
Act, we omit the details of his pre-trial motion for the 
appointment of counsel.  We also express no view on whether 
the District Court erred in denying that motion.  
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After a three-day trial, the jury returned a verdict 
finding Reese guilty on all twelve counts charged in the 
indictment.  As noted, the District Judge sentenced Reese to 
70 months’ imprisonment, restitution, and three years of 
supervised release.  He appeals,2 and we have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
II.  Discussion 
A. Relevant Law 
The Speedy Trial Act generally requires a federal 
criminal trial to begin within 70 days after a defendant is 
                                              
2 On appeal, Reese raises four claims of error related to his 
sentencing.  As a structural error, he contends (i) the District 
Court violated his Sixth Amendment right to choose his 
sentencing counsel by denying his post-conviction motion for 
new counsel.  In addition, he claims (ii) ineffective assistance 
of sentencing counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment, 
(iii) violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
32(i)(1)(A), which requires the District Court to “verify that 
the defendant and the defendant’s attorney have read and 
discussed the presentence report and any addendum to the 
report,” and (iv) overbreadth and vagueness of a special 
condition of supervised release that would prohibit him from 
“obtaining any employment in which he would have control 
over money, finances, or engage in financial transactions.”  
Each of these additional claims of error has considerable 
merit and could very well justify vacating Reese’s sentence 
and remanding for resentencing.  But because we resolve this 
appeal by vacating Reese’s conviction under the Speedy Trial 
Act, we omit here the troubling factual grounds underlying 
these additional claims. 
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charged or appears in the court where the charges are 
pending, whichever is later.  18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1).3  
The Act also contains, however, a series of provisions under 
which specified periods of delay are “excluded” from the 70–
day time limit.  Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 497 
(2006) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)).  Some of the provisions 
exclude time automatically, while others must be invoked by 
a district court to effect an exclusion of time.  See Bloate v. 
United States, 559 U.S. 196, 203–15 (2010).  
Among the provisions that must be invoked by the trial 
court is 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), which allows it to exclude 
time from the 70–day time limit for “the ends of justice.”  
Zedner, 547 U.S. at 508–09 (quoting 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3161(h)(8)(A)).4  As the Act and existing case law make 
clear, an exclusion of time for “the ends of justice” is not 
automatic.  Id.  To do so, a district court must “set[] forth, in 
the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reasons 
for finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of 
such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and 
the defendant in a speedy trial.”  18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). 
                                              
3 In relevant part, the provision states:  “In any case in which 
a plea of not guilty is entered, the trial of a defendant charged 
in an information or indictment with the commission of an 
offense shall commence within seventy days from the filing 
date (and making public) of the information or indictment, or 
from the date the defendant has appeared before a judicial 
officer of the court in which such charge is pending, 
whichever date last occurs.” 
4 The “ends of justice” provision examined by the Zedner 
Court has been relocated from § 3161(h)(8)(A) to the present-
day codification in § 3161(h)(7)(A).  
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The Supreme Court has not elaborated on the timing, 
procedures, or substantive standards that must be satisfied for 
a district court to exclude time for the ends of justice, other 
than to observe that “at the very least the Act implies that [the 
required] findings [of fact] must be put on the record by the 
time [it] rules on a defendant’s motion to dismiss under [the 
Act].”  Zedner, 547 U.S. at 507.  In three prior decisions, we 
have filled these gaps by setting requirements that a district 
court must satisfy to effect an ends-of-justice continuance for 
a specified period of delay.5  
In United States v. Brooks, we held that a district 
court’s continuance order issued on a template continuance 
form was sufficient to exclude time under the Act where the 
district court checked a box on the form corresponding to 
language tracking the applicable exclusion under the Speedy 
Trial Act and later supplemented the record with further 
details of the factual basis for exclusion.  697 F.2d 517, 521–
22 (3d Cir. 1982) (“In the present case, the form, when read 
together with the later statement made by the district court 
explaining in greater detail its reasons for granting the 
continuance, satisfies the requirements of the Act.”).  In 
United States v. Rivera Construction Co., we held that a 
district court’s continuance order may exclude time for the 
“ends of justice” without citing the Act or parroting the 
relevant provisions of the Act so long as the record shows that 
the district court “balanced the interests of the public and of 
all the defendants . . . when it ordered the continuance.”  863 
F.2d 293, 297 (3d Cir. 1988). 
                                              
5 We have also established standards for “open-ended” 
continuances in the ends of justice, see, e.g., United States v. 
Lattany, 982 F.2d 866, 877 (3d Cir. 1992), but we are not 
dealing with an open-ended continuance here.  
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Together, the procedural requirements in Brooks and 
Rivera give considerable leeway to district courts in granting 
continuances for the ends of justice.  For example, under 
Brooks a district court may give the factual basis for an ends-
of-justice continuance after it is entered (but before ruling on 
a motion to dismiss the indictment) if the continuance order 
cites the relevant provision of the Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3161(h)(7)(A), or states that it is for the “ends of justice.”  
See 697 F.2d at 521–22.  Under Rivera, a district court may 
exclude time for the “ends of justice” without citing the Act 
or using any of its magic words so long as the court explains a 
valid factual basis for the continuance on the record when the 
continuance is ordered.  See 863 F.2d at 297.  
But this procedural leeway is not without limits, as we 
made clear one year after Rivera in our third guiding case—
United States v. Brenna, 878 F.2d 117, 122 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(per curiam).  If a district court enters a continuance order 
without either stating the factual basis for excluding time 
under the Act or using language that invokes it, the delay 
caused by the continuance is not excluded and the court 
cannot exclude the time in hindsight.  Id. (“We reaffirm . . . 
that an ends of justice continuance . . . cannot be entered nunc 
pro tunc . . . .”). 
B. Analysis 
As noted, the District Court entered sua sponte 
continuance orders on October 12, 2016, and November 10, 
2016.  Reese contends that neither excluded time under the 
Act.  But we need not address the challenge to the October 
12, 2016 order because we rule in favor of Reese under the 
Act based on the delay caused by the second sua sponte 
continuance.  That order did not validly exclude time under 
the Act.  The contemporaneous record consists of the 
transcript of the pre-trial hearing on November 10 and the 
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written continuance order itself.  Neither invokes the Act nor 
uses any language that would suggest an exclusion of time 
under it, as would be required to allow exclusion under 
Brooks through a later supplementing of the record.  
Likewise, neither contains any factual findings that 
demonstrate a “balanc[ing] [of] the interests of the public and 
of all the defendants,” as would be required to exclude time 
under Rivera.  Accordingly, under Brenna the Court failed to 
exclude time under the Act and the period of delay 
occasioned by the order—a period of at least 71 days6—
counted under the Act. 
There is no dispute that, when the District Court 
entered the November 10, 2016 order, a period of 50 days had 
already expired on the Speedy Trial clock.  Given the 
additional 70-plus unexcluded days caused by the November 
order, the 70–day time limit to bring Reese to trial expired 
long before the first day of his trial.  (Indeed, the unexcluded 
period of delay caused by the order was itself longer than 
what is allowed under the Act.)  
                                              
6 In his opening brief Reese argued that the continuance order 
caused a delay of 71 unexcluded days.  During oral argument 
his counsel acknowledged that the period of delay caused by 
the continuance was actually 79 calendar days and suggested 
that his prior calculation of 71 days may have been an 
understatement.  The Government did not dispute either of 
these calculations, and we need not resolve the minor 
inconsistency because both 71 and 79 are greater than the 70 
days allotted under the Act, especially when added to the 50 
days that had expired before the District Court entered its 
November 2016 order (a number the Government also does 
not contest).  
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The Government makes three principal arguments 
against vacating Reese’s conviction under the Act, no one of 
which succeeds.  First, it contends the continuance was 
entered “in consultation with” Reese’s counsel during the 
November 10 pre-trial conference.  We reject this attempt to 
rewrite the record, which makes clear that the District Court 
began the conference by stating:  “So I’m setting the trial - - 
and I apologize for this, because I can’t try the case until 
February, February 22nd.”  Although D’Andrea’s statement 
in response to the District Court’s postponement of trial 
suggests he may have been unavailable for trial before 
February (which may in turn have been a basis for the Court 
to exclude time under the Act), the Court made no finding 
that it was stopping the clock based on counsel’s availability.  
Rather, the record shows the Court had already made the 
decision to postpone trial due to the Court’s own schedule. 
Second, the Government asserts that Reese cannot now 
complain because he “was present” at the conference and 
“raised no objection to the rescheduled date.”  It emphasizes 
that D’Andrea not only did not object to the continuance, but 
if anything voiced his acquiescence to it.  However, this 
argument runs headlong into Zedner, in which the Supreme 
Court squarely rejected the prospective exclusion of time 
“on the grounds of mere consent or waiver.”  Zedner, 547 
U.S. at 500–01.7 
                                              
7 In denying Reese’s motion to dismiss, the District Court 
cited United States v. Herbst, 666 F.3d 504 (8th Cir. 2012), 
and emphasized that “[t]he defendant sat on his rights, . . . 
made no indications that he disagreed with the 
continuances[,] . . . [a]nd throughout these proceedings he had 
counsel.”  We read Herbst to hold that an ends-of-justice 
continuance granted on the defendant’s motion will exclude 
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Third, the Government argues that Reese’s Speedy 
Trial Act challenge fails because he did not establish 
prejudice.  But those arguments, which rely on case law 
addressing the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, do 
not apply in the Speedy Trial Act context.  As Justice Alito 
explained for a unanimous Supreme Court in Zedner, “[t]he 
relevant provisions of the Act are unequivocal . . . .  When a 
trial is not commenced within the prescribed period of time, 
‘the information or indictment shall be dismissed on motion 
of the defendant.’”  547 U.S. at 508 (emphasis in original).  
The remedy provision of the Act leaves no room for a 
prejudice or harmless error analysis.  Id. at 508–09.  
III.   Conclusion 
Our decisions give district courts considerable leeway 
in making the findings required to exclude time from the 70–
day time limit under the Speedy Trial Act.  But there are still 
limits.  When a district court enters a continuance order 
without either stating the factual basis for excluding time 
under the Act or using language that invokes it (the latter of 
which allows a later factual explanation), the delay caused by 
the continuance is not excluded and the district court cannot 
exclude the time in hindsight.  That a defendant does not 
object to the continuance or even expresses acquiescence to 
the continuance does not change this analysis. 
                                                                                                     
time even if the defendant disagreed with his attorney’s 
decision to file the motion, but that holding does not and 
cannot overrule the principle reaffirmed by the Supreme 
Court in Zedner that a defendant’s mere consent or failure to 
object to a continuance is sufficient to exclude time under the 
Act. 
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In this case, as a result of the District Court’s 
November 2016 sua sponte continuance, the 70–day clock 
expired long before Reese was brought to trial.  When he 
moved to dismiss the indictment under the Act, the Court 
should have dismissed the indictment.  The remedy for this 
error is to reverse the District Court’s decision, vacate 
Reese’s conviction, and remand for dismissal of the 
indictment.  That Court needs to decide in the first instance 
whether the dismissal is with or without prejudice per the 
factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2).  
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United States of America v. Kevin Reese 
No. 17-2484 
_________________________________________________ 
 
AMBRO and GREENAWAY, Circuit Judges, concurring  
We write separately to address a trend among our 
sister Circuits that appears to be expanding the doctrine of 
waiver by defendants under the Speedy Trial Act.  To be 
clear, the Government has foregone any assertion that Reese 
waived his Speedy Trial Act challenge in this case by not 
raising the issue in its appellate brief or in oral argument.  See 
United States v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 366 F.3d 164, 174 
n.2 (3d Cir. 2004).  We nonetheless mention the trend and 
consider whether the doctrine of waiver would preclude 
Reese’s challenge in this appeal were that issue before us.  
We conclude it would not.  
As background, we note the well-settled rule that a 
defendant generally may not elect to waive the protections of 
the Speedy Trial Act, other than by failing to move to dismiss 
the indictment under 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2).  See United 
States v. Carrasquillo, 667 F.2d 382, 388–89 (3d Cir. 1981); 
accord United States v. Gambino, 59 F.3d 353, 360 (2d Cir. 
1995) (“[W]hen Congress considered” the issue, “it limited 
waiver of the 70–day speedy trial requirement to narrowly 
defined circumstances, i.e., a failure to move for dismissal 
prior to trial or prior to the entry of a guilty or nolo 
contendere plea.”) (collecting cases).  This principle was 
sustained in Zedner, in which the Court held that a defendant 
may not prospectively waive the protections of the Act.  547 
U.S. at 501.  This is so, the Court explained, because “the Act 
was designed with the public interest firmly in mind,” and 
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“[t]hat public interest cannot be served . . . if defendants may 
opt out of the Act entirely.”  Id.  
In recent years, however, Courts of Appeals have 
come to recognize a new kind of waiver under the Act.  The 
Seventh Circuit was the first expressly to break this ground in 
United States v. O’Connor, in which the Court considered 
whether a defendant waived the ability to challenge on appeal 
several ends-of-justice continuances she had not challenged 
specifically in her pre-trial motion to dismiss the indictment.  
656 F.3d 630, 637 (7th Cir. 2011).  O’Connor construed the 
Supreme Court’s comment in Zedner that the Act “assigns the 
role of spotting violations of the Act to defendants,” 547 U.S. 
at 502, to mean that “any specific violation not raised in a 
motion to dismiss is waived.”  656 F.3d at 638. 
Since the Seventh Circuit’s decision in O’Connor, four 
other Circuits have reached essentially the same conclusion.  
As most recently formulated by the Second Circuit, these 
courts have held that filing a timely motion to dismiss on 
Speedy Trial Act grounds is not enough if a defendant “fail[s] 
to challenge a particular period of delay.”  United States v. 
Holley, 813 F.3d 117, 121 (2d Cir. 2016) (per curiam); see 
also United States v. Taplet, 776 F.3d 875, 881 (D.C. Cir. 
2015); United States v. Loughrin, 710 F.3d 1111, 1121 (10th 
Cir. 2013); United States v. Gates, 709 F.3d 58, 67 (1st Cir. 
2013).  Thus, those Circuits have held, “[w]hen a defendant 
fails to specify the particular exclusions of time within his or 
her motion to dismiss, [he] has failed to move for dismissal 
on that ground” and has waived the right to dismissal because 
of it.  Holley, 813 F.3d at 121.  
These Circuits have buttressed their holdings with 
several prudential considerations.  First, if a defendant is not 
deemed to waive arguments unmade in the motion to dismiss, 
“[it] would force the court on a motion to dismiss [on Speedy 
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Trial Act grounds] to consider every conceivable basis for 
challenging its orders of continuance and exclusions of time, 
for fear that the defendant would raise new arguments on 
appeal.”  Loughrin, 710 F.3d at 1121; accord, e.g., O’Connor, 
656 F.3d at 638 (“If [the mere] filing a motion to dismiss 
were enough to preserve all violations of the Act—whether 
identified in the motion or not—then the district court or the 
government, rather than the defendant, would effectively bear 
the burden of ‘spotting violations,’ contrary to the Court’s 
instruction in Zedner.”).  Second, forcing a defendant to 
identify specific periods of delay “ensures that the district 
court has the opportunity to develop all arguments below and 
fully explain its reasoning for excluding a particular period of 
delay.”  Holley, 813 F.3d at 121.  Third, “requiring 
defendants to notify district courts of any potential exclusions 
of time within their motions to dismiss . . . prevents undue 
defense gamesmanship.”  Taplet, 776 F.3d at 880 (quotation 
marks omitted).  In the absence of this broadened waiver 
doctrine, the rationale goes, defendants may “withhold 
meritorious non-excludable time in their motions to dismiss 
on the chance that, if their trials go badly,” an appellate 
court’s reversal under the Act will provide “a one-time reset 
button” and give them “a second bite of the apple.”  Id. at 
881. 
We observe that a different approach to construing the 
waiver provision in the Act is more easily reconciled with the 
language of the Act and the Zedner decision.  A defendant 
who moves to dismiss an indictment under the Act has “the 
burden of proof of supporting such motion.”  18 U.S.C. 
§ 3162(a)(2).  Thus, to the extent a defendant’s motion is 
premised on a challenge to the district court’s exclusion of a 
specific period of time under the Act, he bears the burden to 
prove the exclusion was invalid.  We thus would reach the 
same result as our sister Circuits in that scenario.   
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But to the extent a defendant’s motion is premised 
more generally on the clear expiration of more than 70 
unexcluded days under the Act, the defendant can meet his 
burden of proof under 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) by notifying the 
district court of its expiration through a basic motion to 
dismiss under the Act.  In that latter scenario, a district court 
is obliged under Zedner at least to “tally the unexcluded 
days” and, if they exceed the 70 days allowed under the Act, 
dismiss the indictment per the Act.  547 U.S. at 507.   
In most cases the distinction we propose will make no 
difference.  Generally a defendant seeking dismissal on 
Speedy Trial Act grounds will need to challenge a district 
court’s exclusion of time to succeed on his motion.  This 
means that a defendant typically must “challenge a particular 
period of delay,” as other Circuits have held.  Holley, 813 
F.3d at 121.  But in some cases a basic motion to dismiss will 
suffice to establish the point that dismissal is warranted.  For 
example, if a defendant were indicted and arraigned but the 
court never set a date for trial, it would make no sense to 
require the defendant to challenge a specific continuance 
order or a specific period of delay other than to move to 
dismiss in a timely way.  Similarly in this case (when Reese 
filed his motion at the end of the over 70–day unexcluded 
delay caused by the District Court’s sua sponte continuance), 
Reese’s motion was enough to demonstrate to the Court that 
more than 70 unexcluded days had expired.  
In short, we believe Reese’s Speedy Trial Act 
challenge would have survived a waiver argument had the 
Government made one.  
